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Promises and Challenges of the International
Criminal Court: view from a small State
By  Dr.  J. Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia)
Introduction
July 1, 2002, became a landmark in international community’s quest for
ending impunity for the most serious crimes and ensuring criminal prosecution
for their perpetrators. On that day, an independent, permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) was established with clear jurisdiction to try perpetrators
of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The ICC
embodies the shared core values of human dignity and of peace and security. It
is seen as a timely answer to the need to develop and strengthen the emerging
international criminal justice system. The realistic character of ICC is reflected
in the fact that it does not challenge the Westphalian system of international
relations; it is based on the principle of complementarily and reflects current
institutional and other structures of power.
Main achievements of the ICC
The ICC is a major achievement of the XX century, a century which has
seen enormous progress in humankind’s development as well as great tragedies
unfold, bringing death and suffering to millions of human beings. It is rightly
seen as the greatest advance in international law since the founding of the United
Nations in 1945. Today it constitutes the missing link in international law that
would enable the international community to bring justice to international
criminals as well as serve as a warning for potential ones and their collaborators.
The culture of impunity is still prevalent in international relations and
international law. At the same time the history of wars reveals the progressive
increase in total number of victims, especially among the civilian population,
which prompted speedy development of international humanitarian law. Thus,
if in World War I 4% of the total number of victims were civilians, it increased
to almost 50 % in World War II, 60 % in the Korean war and 70 % in the
Vietnam war. The share of civilian casualties in the war in Afghanistan was
also very high. At the same time it is also evident from the modern history that
international crimes are increasingly committed in peace time and that according
to UN about 80 % of the victims of all armed conflicts are civilians.
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It could be said that until the creation of the ICC the measures taken by
the international community in fighting international crimes have mostly been
ex post facto and were limited in scope. Thus the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR)  by the UN
Security Council were also ex post facto. The tribunals were set up after hundreds
of thousands people had been massacred. Nevertheless  the two ad hoc tribunals
marked a step towards creation of the ICC. Since they were created by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter they were legally binding on
all States. On the other hand, they were more political organs subsidiary to the
Council with jurisdiction limited in time and space, than independent legal
bodies with universal jurisdiction.
The work on the Rome Statute enormously benefited from the experiences
of the two ad hoc tribunals, contributed to further development of international
humanitarian law and its extension to non-international armed conflicts. Their
judgments, concerning genocide, command responsibility and other judgments
may prove to be useful for the Court.
The Court embodies the ideals, ideas and norms developed so far by the
previous ad hoc practices and the international criminal law development in
general. ICC is not a supranational body, but an international agreement and,
as such, depends to a great extent on cooperation with States and among them.
It is based on the principle of complementarity and thus it does not replace
national criminal systems, but rather complements them. Only in two cases
will the Court get involved: a) when a national legal system is not able to
investigate and prosecute persons alleged to have committed the crimes under
its jurisdiction, for instance when such a system has collapsed;  b) when a
national legal system refuses or fails to investigate and prosecute such persons.
The material element of the criminal responsibility (actus reus), the
intentional element (mens rea) and the conditions of admissibility of cases are
all clearly spelt out in the Statute. Moreover, it has also codified the general
principles of criminal law, including non bis in idem, nullum crimen sine lege,
nulla poena sine lege, individual criminal responsibility, irrelevance of official
capacity, presumption of innocence, etc. The Statute also reflected the high
standards of criminal justice such as due process (judicial responsibility, non-
retroactivity of punishment, etc), fair trial (impartial court established by the
law, trying on the basis of legislation, being informed of the nature and cause
of the charges, right to defend oneself), rights of the accused, rights of the third
parties, compensation for victims and/or their families, etc. All these were
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elaborated and negotiated at great length and have been agreed upon by
consensus.
   Expectations and weaknesses of the Court
Historically, the ICC tries to fill the huge lacuna that existed so far in
international criminal law: clear-cut definitions of crimes and effective
mechanisms of enforcing the law and punishing criminals. On the other hand,
the Rome Statute, being a product of long negotiations and delicate
compromises, is not a perfect document and does not fully satisfy the interests
of all States, including small States. The latter by their nature are interested in
the rule of law: it is in their self-interest that the use of force is outlawed and
that States and individuals are held responsible for their use. History
demonstrates again and again that it is mainly the smaller States that usually
fall victim of aggression or manipulated to be used in such aggression. In many
cases they fall victim of tyrannical or repressive rule not without the influence
of outside powers, where grave crimes are committed.
From the perspective of small States the weaknesses of the Court are:
1) The ICC Statute does not include the crime of aggression as one of the
core crimes, even though for small States aggression has always been and still
is the “threat of all threats.” History, including that of the XX century, is full of
wars of aggression, big and small, in which the smaller States usually have
been the victims. In 1998 in Rome, where the draft Statute was finalized and
adopted, the proponents of including the crime of aggression in the Statute did
not insist on its inclusion, because they did not want to impede the speediest
adoption of the Statute. They agreed that the question of adding aggression to
the list of the core crimes in the Statute could be looked at again in seven years
- that is in 2009 - once or if the definition of aggression is agreed upon by that
time.
 2) Despite the insistence of many States, the Statute does not cover the
threat or use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—that is, the use or
threat of use of weapons of mass destruction.
3) The Statute does not include drug—related crimes or gross
environmental crimes that might have long-lasting, devastating effects on human
health or the environment. The difficulty of defining these crimes clearly should
not be used as a pretext to exclude them from the Statute in the future. For
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Mongolia, the question of nuclear waste disposal by the two neighboring nuclear
powers in the vicinity of its borders is of great concern.
4) Penalties envisaged in the Statute, even cumulative penalties, are not
severe enough to deter many prospective perpetrators.
 5) There are other weaknesses of substance and procedure in the Statute,
with which many States are not satisfied, especially small States.
However, this does not mean that States should reject the Statute and the
ICC. On the contrary. In Rome on July 17, 1998, 120 States overwhelmingly
voted in favor of the Statute. It took only four years for the Statute to enter into
force, showing how much support the Court enjoys in the international
community. As of 25 June, 2003, 139 States have signed the Statute, and 90
have ratified it.
Materialization of ideals of international criminal justice
Although the idea of criminal prosecution of perpetrators of grave
international crimes has always been on the minds of people, the actual process
of creating an international criminal justice system started at the end of World
War II, in 1945. Until then, international crimes, though deplored, were virtually
not punishable. There were some attempts to bring to justice the perpetrators
or organizers of international crimes, but they proved to be futile.
The first concrete steps to establish an international criminal court were
made in 1945 and 1946, with the establishment of ad hoc international military
tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Although a basis was laid then for the
establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court, the cold  war
interrupted and impeded interstate cooperation in this field, like in virtually all
other fields. The efforts of the U.N. International Law Commission to draft a
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind bore little fruit
because of the cold  war ideological and political confrontations and mutual
suspicion. In the meantime, the international community witnessed over 250
conflicts that caused the deaths of 86 million civilians, while 170 million people
were stripped of their rights, property, and dignity.
Development of international criminal law
The case for the permanent International Criminal Court was revived in
the wake of the atrocities witnessed by the international community in early
1990s in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. In response to the genocide
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committed in former Yugoslavia, which claimed lives of at least 200,000
innocent civilians, the United Nations Security Council established in 1993 the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia with the purpose of to trying
the perpetrators. In 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was
established to try the individuals responsible for genocide in Rwanda. During
the civil war there, almost 800,000 people, mainly Tutsis, had been massacred.
With the establishment of these two ad hoc tribunals, the question of
bringing perpetrators to justice was put on the agenda of the international
community. Truth commissions, dismissal or suspension of officials implicated
in such crimes, seizure of assets and property of convicted criminals, blocking
of financial sources, compensation for victims and families, and other measures
of accountability are now being used in many cases throughout the world.
In December of 2002, eight judges were sworn in to serve on the United
Nations’ special tribunal consisting of both international and national judges to
try those accused of responsibility for war crimes in Sierra Leone’s recent civil
war.  The tribunal is to try those responsible for the genocide that has claimed
lives of tens of thousands of innocent civilians. In June 2003 the tribunal issued
a warrant for the arrest of Charles Taylor, the current President of Liberia for
his alleged support of rebel groups during the civil war in Sierra Leone. This
unprecedented step underlines yet again the growing understanding of and need
for accountability and ending impunity for the crimes committed. The Indonesian
human rights court convicted the most notorious militia leader for crimes against
humanity committed during the 1999 massacre in East Timore after its people
voted for independence. There are talks of trying the leaders of the former
Iraqi regime responsible for grave human rights violations and massacres.
In March of 2003, as a result of 5 years of hard negotiations,  agreement
has been reached between the United Nations and the Government of Cambodia
to establish an ad hoc tribunal to investigate the genocide of 1.7 million
Cambodians in the 1970s, when the Khmers Rouges were in power. The tribunal
is to be composed of Cambodian and foreign judges. Although these and other
similar measures are welcomed, however belatedly, they are all  ad hoc  measures
and are limited in time and space.
At the national level, many States, including those that are not parties to
ICC Statue are adopting legislation, such as war crimes laws, that are in line
with the Statute. These measures are useful in making impunity and individual
responsibility important principles of international criminal law. In 1993
Belgium has adopted an unusual war crimes law based on the principle of
“universal jurisdiction” that allowed Belgian courts to consider cases of genocide
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and other atrocities committed in other countries. Thus it allowed plaintiffs to
lodge war-crimes and crimes against humanity cases directly, with no decision
by a prosecutor, and the cases were allowed to proceed against defendants who
were not even present. In June 2003, bearing in mind the difficulties the
legislation raised with respect to cases considered to have political aims, Belgium
has revised the law to limit it to cases where Belgians and Belgian residents
would be directly involved as victims or suspects. The Belgian example clearly
demonstrates that the principle of “universal jurisdiction”, though is gaining
wide support, needs to be carefully defined so as not to allow it to be abused in
international relations.
Mongolia and the Court
Mongolia has always been one of the ardent supporters of the creation of
the ICC and of strengthening the international criminal justice system in general.
In the past century, especially in its first part, Mongolia was victim of aggression
and threats of it. Thus in 1919, 1921, and 1939, it became object of aggression
or military incursions. In order to prevent invasion from one of its neighbors,
Mongolia turned for help to the other neighbor, only to find itself in the “bear
hug” of the latter.
Under Soviet pressure, Mongolia underwent Soviet-style social
experimentation and manipulation. The ideological class struggle was imposed
upon Mongolia, which divided the society into the working class and exploiters,
into “reliables” and “unreliables.” As a result of such a policy in the late 1930s,
almost 10 percent of the entire population was exterminated or persecuted.
The foreign and national schemers, organizers, and executioners of the policy
of “class genocide” went unpunished.
In the early 1990s, both the Mongolian and Soviet or Russian governments
formally admitted that crimes had been committed in late 1930s. However,
since the crimes had been committed almost half a century ago and since the
oppressive system has been overthrown, it was decided not to identify and
pursue the executioners of purges and repressions. Today, the Mongolian
government is compensating, though belatedly and almost symbolically, the
families of the victims of those purges and repressions.
In our southern neighbor, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of
the mid-1960s to the 1970s, which is known as the “decade of chaos,” saw
hundreds of thousands of people, including Mongolian nationals, physically
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and mentally persecuted. No one was brought to justice for instigating or
organizing the atrocities perpetrated during that period.
Mongolia is proud to be one of the founding members of the Court, one
of its few Asian members1. It believes that the establishment of ICC is the first
major practical step in institutionalizing an international criminal justice system.
It believes that based on the principle of complementarity, the ICC can in due
time increase accountability, nationally and internationally.
Now that the eighteen judges and the Prosecutor have been elected and
sworn into office, the next important stage of development in the international
criminal justice system will be the formation of the organs of the Court and
taking first practical steps, in line with the principle of complementarity, to
bring to justice individuals implicated in the commission of the crimes defined
in the Statute and perpetrated after July 1, 2002. As of the creation of the Court
in 2002, almost two hundred cases had been filed with it.  Therefore it would
be up to the Prosecutor and his team to make sure that only those cases that
come under Court’s jurisdiction would be taken up by it, and that justice would
be rendered without undue delays.
Misperceptions about the Court
On the public relations side, the Court has to cope with two major
misperceptions:
1) that it would be a supranational court, with powers superceding national
laws and courts;
2) that the it would be a panacea for international crimes. Those are
dangerous misperceptions. The ICC is not a supranational organ, and it will not
automatically prevent international crimes. It could, if effective, render justice
and deter crimes in many cases. It is generally agreed that much will depend on
the Court’s credibility and actions.
Major challenge: United States’ position
Because of the above and similar misperceptions and insufficient
information about the ICC, it seems that work needs to be undertaken to explain
the nature and goals of the Court. That would enable many States to ratify the
Statute speedily and become party to the Court. One of the challenges of the
international community is to persuade U.S. not to take any measures that would
in practice weaken ICC or the support of it.   Work also needs to be undertaken
1 Mongolia signed the Statute on 29 December 2001 and ratified it on 5 April, 2002
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by States parties to the Court to allay the unfounded fears and suspicions of
those that see it as a possible threat to sovereignty of States and their actions.
Due to the role that U.S. plays in the world and to its enormous influence,
its position viz-a-viz the Court is very important in making the activities of the
Court effective and the Court itself truly universal in nature. Although the United
States was in general supportive of the idea of strengthening international
criminal law and participated actively in negotiating the Statute and other
relevant documents of the ICC, it has some misgivings, which the overwhelming
majority of the international community does not consider to be fully founded.
In a nutshell, the official U.S. position with respect to the ICC is as follows:
the Court infringes on the sovereignty of States; it could be used in politically
motivated trials; the prosecutor will be uncontrollable; the Court could threaten
U.S. freedom of action, etc. The United States wanted exemptions from
prosecution of both U.S. civilians and U.S. military personnel. Since demanding
exceptions for U.S. citizens was not politically feasible, during negotiations of
the draft Statute the United States even proposed that permanent members of
the Security Council, or even all States, be allowed to protect their nationals
from the ICC’s reach. The main reasoning was that the United States played an
exceptional role in international relations and, therefore, deserved exemptions
from the rules that apply to other States.
Other States, naturally, did not accept this reasoning, believing that there
should not be any exceptions to the rule of law and to equality before the law.
Therefore, U.S. demand for ironclad guarantees that in any circumstances
Americans be shielded from the ICC was not accepted in 1998 in Rome. The
U.S. position is still not widely accepted today, though since some States in
bilateral agreements with U.S. acquiesced to their demands. Many in Rome
believed and still believe today that the international community had already
made sufficient adjustments in the Statute to accommodate most of U.S.
demands. Indeed, during negotiations since the mid- 1990s on the text of the
Statute, U.S. negotiators were very active and succeeded in having most of
their proposals and concerns reflected in the negotiating text. As a result, there
are adequate procedural safeguards in the Statute to protect States’ prerogatives.
The Court will act only in cases when the national courts are unable or unwilling
to act. There is little doubt as to the ability of U.S. courts to render justice.
Many articles have appeared to try to explain Washington’s official
position. They reflect U.S. positions and apprehensions, especially those
concerning the so-called uncontrolled prosecutor.  Careful scrutiny of the Statute
demonstrates that the prosecutor is not uncontrolled. The only circumstance
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when a State, even the United States, might be overruled is when the Pre-Trial
Chamber overrules and authorizes the prosecutor to investigate or prosecute.
Since the prosecutor and his deputies were elected by the Assembly of States
Parties, they will be accountable to it as to the exercise of jurisdiction at various
stages of future proceedings. All this leads us to believe that the problem lies
not with the Statute but with the lack of political will on the part of the U.S..
Article 16 and “blanket exemptions”
Although most of U.S. concerns have been addressed in the Statute and
the two subsidiary documents, the Clinton Administration signed the Rome
Statute reluctantly on December 21, 2000. However, the Bush Administration
not only “unsigned” the Statute in May 2002, which is an unprecedented step
in modern history of international relations, but it has since working to
discourage others from ratifying the Statute. In order to achieve its goal, in
spring of 2002 U.S. threatened to veto the extension by the Security Council of
UN peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, unless U.S. concerns
over immunity were addressed. Thus acting contrary to the spirit of Article 16
of the Statute2, the United States succeeded, through the Security Council of
the United Nations and invoking Chapter VII (?!?) of the Charter, to weaken
the ICC standing by demanding a blanket exemption of its personnel from all
peacekeeping missions. Although the United States was not able to get unlimited
blanket exemption, it was able, through Security Council resolution 1422 (2000),
to obtain for itself and for other non-parties to the ICC Statute, that participate
in U.N. established or authorized peacekeeping operations, annual, though
potentially permanent, exemption from the purview of the Court. The resolution
of the Security Council thus de facto allows States non-parties to multilateral
agreements to subvert the fundamental principles of such agreements, in this
case equality before the law. In practical terms it also amounts to
misinterpretation of the Statute and its de facto amendment. The exemption
applies not only to U.S. military personnel, but also to those of many other
major powers and States that contribute their personnel to UN peacekeeping
operations and are not parties to ICC.3 In June 2003 the U.S. was able to extend
2 Article 16 of the Statute of ICC stipulates: “Deferral of investigation or prosecution. No investigation
or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the
Security Council, in a resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions”.
3 As of June 2003 there are 14 UN peacekeeping operations in progress where almost 37.000 people
are carrying out Security Council mandates. Over 18.000 of them represent States parties to the ICC and are
thus already under the jurisdiction of the Court. Only 1.5 % (or 558)  are U.S. citizens; most of them are civilian
police; there are only two troops under UN command.
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that exemption for another year through Security Council resolution 1487
(2003)4, though, unlike the previous year, three member States (France, Germany
and Syria) abstained and many States voiced their opposition to the extension
of the exemption. Many believed that there was no basis to invoke Chapter VII
of the Charter.
Article 98 and “immunity agreements”
In order to exempt further its soldiers and personnel from the ICC’s
complementarity jurisdiction, i.e. from even non – U.N. operations, and find a
more durable solution to its concerns, the United States adopted in August
2002 the American Service members’ Protection Act (ASPA), which authorizes
U.S. President to use force, if necessary, to retrieve US nationals from detention
by the Court and to withdraw military aid from the States that are unwilling to
grant US nationals immunity from the Court through signing of the so-called
Article 98 “impunity agreements”.
 Article 98 of the Statute5 was intended to address the possible conflict of
the Statute with the existing international agreements, namely the Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and the Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs).
The article was not intended to allow conclusion of new agreements6. Therefore
signing of “impunity agreements” violates the obligations that States Parties to
the Rome Statute have undertaken when acceding to the Court. As a result of
its forceful campaigns, the U.S. has been able to conclude such agreements
with 44 States, including with 18 States Parties to the Statute. The list shows
that most of them are small and weak States.  However, many States, including
some NATO partners of the United States, are still resisting U.S. pressures.
4 Security Council resolution 1487 (2003) stipulates, inter alia,  that…. “acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations,… the Council…1. Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the
Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials  or personnel from a contributing
State not Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized
operation, shall from for a 12 month period starting 1 July 2003 not commence or proceed with investigation or
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;  2. Expresses the intention to
renew the request in paragraph 1 under the same conditions each 1 July for further 12-month periods for as long
as may be necessary.
5 Article 98 of ICC Statute reads as follows:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or
diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of
that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to
act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending
State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation
of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
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Thus European States have been trying to adopt, with mixed results, a common
approach or policy towards U.S. pressure by finding ways to address its concerns
without undermining the ICC Statute.
It is to be hoped that as ICC begins its historic mission, the U.S. will
be able to see that its apprehensions concerning the ICC were unfounded and
that there are ample safeguards against its abuse for political or ideological
considerations, and that U.S. would thus reconsider its opposition to the Court
and would work with it.
Mongolia’s dilemma
As of writing of this article, many States, including small States, are facing
a dilemma: by their nature they are in favor of strengthening international law,
including emerging international criminal justice system. Many of them are
parties to the Rome Statute and are expected to abide by its provisions in
accordance with the universally accepted principle of  pacta sunt servanda.
On the other hand, the world’s most powerful State and the United Nations
Security Council, which according to the UN Charter has the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the
decisions of which all member States have agreed to accept and carry out,7 are
sending out a signal that would compel States either to act in contravention of
the Rome Statute or Article 25 of the UN Charter. Many members of ICC have
chosen to abide by the Rome Statute, while others have chosen to follow their
immediate short term interests and are thus following the second option with
the hope that in due time this dilemma could be resolved without harming the
integrity of the Court.
Like all other States “caught between the rock and the hard place”,
Mongolia is also facing the same dilemma. Having been actively involved in
the negotiation of the Rome Statute8 and having become one of the founding
members of the Court, Mongolia has committed itself to uphold the principles
and provisions of the Statute.  Thus when signing and later ratifying the Statute,
in line with the latter’s Article 120, it did not make reservation. Explaining the
6 Thus the drafting history reveals that Article 98 was not intended to include agreements such as the
U.S. is proposing to others. Therefore such agreements, if concluded, cannot meet the requirements of good
faith interpretation of the Statute.
7  Article 25 of the United Nations Charter stipulates: The Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council  in accordance with the present Charter.
8 Mongolia has consistently supported the inclusion of aggression in the list of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court. It has also proposed that policies leading to widespread environmental degradation
with grave and long-lasting effects on the health of the population, such as radiation by nuclear wastes or other
similar acts, be included in the list of crimes.
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position of the Mongolian Government Mr. L. Erdenechuluun, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Mongolia declared on 15 September, 2002 at the General
Assembly that Mongolia believed the Court could be instrumental in ending
impunity and upholding justice, deterring future crimes and further strengthening
international criminal law.
When the question concerning Article 16 and of the blanket exemptions
were raised in 2002 at the United Nations Security Council, the representative
of Mongolia made the following statement at the meeting of the Security Council
explaining the position of the its Government:
“The ICC is expected to be a permanent, independent international court.
It will not be bound by mandates that are specific in time and place. Its provisions
are consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and is based on the principle
of respect for sovereignty of States, which is manifested, inter alia, in the
principle of complementarity of its jurisdiction. In other words, the Court would
take action only when national legal systems are unable or unwilling to genuinely
investigate or prosecute. Moreover, the Court has ratione temporis jurisdiction,
i.e. it has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after 1 July, 2002.
Under Article 16 of the Statute, the Security Council can request, under Chapter
VII of the Charter, the deferral of investigation or prosecution of a case for a
period of 12 months. The request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.
…. Logically and legally, the two bodies, i.e. the Security Council and
the ICC are expected to work together, and not one to the detriment of the
other. No State should be placed in a situation when it is forced to breach its
international obligations either under the Charter or the Statute. We believe
that both the Security Council and the ICC should work together to strengthen
international peace and security, the rule of law and international justice.
Mongolia, one of the founding members of the ICC, is interested, like all others,
in maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of the Court, since the very first
days of its existence. We have faith in the integrity of the Court, since the
Statute has adequate safeguards against its possible abuse. We believe that by
its activities, the Court will be able to dispel any lingering doubts as to its
impartiality and effectiveness. When considering the Court’s jurisdiction, we
should not forget that the main objective of the ICC is prosecution of individuals
for the most heinous crimes that have been defined in Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of
the Statute. In other words looking at a tree nearest to oneself, one should not
forget the entire forest that is behind it.”
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The representative of Mongolia ended his statement with expressing the
hope that the Council would be able to find a solution that would respect the
spirit and letter of the Statute and would not undermine the effective functioning
of the Court and of the Council. After the deliberations, the Security Council
adopted its resolution 1422 (2002) intended to prevent the Court from extending
its jurisdiction over persons involved in operations established or authorized
by the Security Council if they are nationals of States that are not parties to the
ICC.
Like many other States, Mongolia was soon approached by the U.S. to
conclude a bilateral agreement aimed at exempting Americans from the Court’s
jurisdiction. After some hesitation on 6 June, 2003 Mongolia agreed to the
U.S. proposed draft without any changes or modifications.
The author believes that the U.S.-Mongolian agreement is in violation of
Mongolia’s commitments under the Rome Statute. Thus signing the agreement
violates not only the spirit of Article 96 of the Statute and goes against good
faith interpretation of the article, but also Article 86 and many other concrete
articles. Moreover, if Mongolia was to agree to temporary exemption of U.S.
personnel, then, bearing in mind the fact that United Nations Security Council
had adopted resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003), it should have:
Insisted on narrowing down the list of “persons” to be covered by the
agreement and to limit them only to those stipulated in the Security Council
resolutions (and not all U.S. nationals and all current and former U.S. military
personnel);
Proposed narrowing down any reference to international tribunals for
which the exemption might apply (and not agree to exempt the “persons” from
surrender or transfer from “any international tribunal for any purpose, unless
such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, as being asked
by the U.S. from many States);
Insisted that the “persons” who are to be prosecuted for the crimes,
mentioned in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, if extradited to U.S. be prosecuted
by the appropriate courts;
Insisted that the question of application of the provisions of the agreement
be based solely on the decisions of the Mongolian Government;
Insisted that the agreement make explicit reference to Security Council
resolutions mentioned above;
 Insisted that, like the Security Council resolutions mentioned above, the
agreement be concluded for a period of one year or that its duration be linked
to the decisions of the Security Council regarding Article 16 of the Rome Statute,
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its interpretation by the States Parties to the Statute or by the  International
Court of Justice in the form of advisory opinion;
made a declaration when signing and ratifying the agreement explaining
the Government’s position with respect to ICC Statute and the Security Council
resolutions mentioned above.
Other challenges to ICC
Although the negative attitude of the United States towards the ICC is a
major political and legal challenge, there are many other challenges that States
are facing in order to fully implement the Rome Statute and thus make the
Court an effective organ to fight impunity and deter crimes. One such challenge
is to make the Court a truly universal body. At present, unlike the United Nations,
it is far from being a universal body.  Much needs to be done to convince States
that may have second thoughts about the ICC, especially concerning its
efficiency and effectiveness, that their active support could make a difference
in strengthening international peace and security and in promoting peace with
and through justice.
Implementation of the Statute
States that are members of the Court need to take measures to bring their
legislation in conformity with the Rome Statute. Thus according to the
Mongolian national legislation, once an international treaty is ratified by the
State Great Hural, or Parliament, of Mongolia, it automatically becomes part
of domestic legislation. Mongolia has recently revised its criminal and criminal
procedural codes which reflect many of the provisions of the Statute. However,
still, much needs to be done for smooth and full implementation of the provisions
of the Statute. Thus the questions of extradition of Mongolian nationals and of
the privileges and immunities of State officials need to be addressed. For
example, Constitutional provisions on immunity do not explicitly make
exceptions for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
Mongolian criminal legislation needs to be further updated to reflect the accurate
definitions of the crimes reflected in the Statue. As a State party, Mongolia
needs to be able to provide all forms of cooperation to the Court and its organs,
as stipulated in Part IX of the Statute. The legislation should also more fully
reflect offences against the administration of justice.
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Conclusion
The Statute is not a perfect document and States know that. However,
most of them also understand and accept that it is essential to advance the goal
of ending impunity and preventing commission of grave international crimes,
despite the difficulties and challenges that lie ahead. Many States, including
Mongolia, have made their choice, and, despite some setbacks, are prepared to
move ahead. Many more have yet to make their choice. The role of the United
States in international relations is vital, and many States, including great powers
such as Russia, China and India are waiting for the United States to take the
lead in strengthening international criminal law and ending impunity. It is hoped
that the United States will accept the historic challenge, join others, and become
once again the primary force in strengthening peace and justice throughout the
world. Acting together, States would be able to further strengthen the Court
and make it a truly effective and efficient judicial organ to combat grave crimes
and bring to justice their perpetrators.
